UEFI Updates and Open Source Firmware Evolutions on Arm

Spring 2019 UEFI Plugfest
April 8-12, 2019
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Agenda

- UEFI SBBR & EBBR Updates
- Open Source Firmware evolutions on Arm
  - Trusted Firmware Updates
  - Secure Software Isolation Recap
  - Firmware challenges for Edge
- Questions?

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UEFI Updates:
Server Base Boot Requirements &
Embedded Base Boot Requirements
SBBR: Server Base Boot Requirements

Operating systems running on standard server hardware require standard firmware interfaces to be present in order to boot and function correctly. The Server Base Board Boot Requirements (SBBR) document describes these firmware requirements. The SBBR covers UEFI, ACPI and SMBIOS industry standards as well as standards specific to Arm, such as PSCI. Together with SBSA, the SBBR provides a standard based approach to building Arm servers and their firmware. The specification is developed in conjunctions with partners across the industry.

For more information, please visit: https://developer.arm.com/products/architecture/system-architecture/server-system-architecture

License

Arm Confidential Proprietary Notice for drafts and Arm Non-Confidential Proprietary Notice for released final spec.

Contribution

Members of the Arm Server Advisory Committee may submit Engineering Change Requests (ECRs) and the Committee decides to approve/reject the ECRs. There is a mailing list and a monthly conference call.

Release

EBBR: Embedded Base Boot Requirements
The Embedded Base Boot Requirements specification defines requirements for embedded systems to enable inter-operability between SoCs, hardware platforms, firmware implementations, and operating system distributions. The aim is to establish consistent boot ABIs and behavior so that supporting new hardware platforms does not require custom engineering work.

EBBR is intended for embedded and things-edge devices

For more information, please visit: https://github.com/ARM-software/ebbr

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Contributions are accepted under the same with sign-off under the Developer’s Certificate of Origin.

Contribution
Anyone may contribute to EBBR. Discussion is on the boot-architecture@lists.linaro.org and arm.ebbr-discuss@arm.com mailing list, and there is a weekly conference call.

Release
v1.0 in March 2019
Secure Boot and Capsule Services for Firmware Update are of interest in future versions
Open Source Firmware Evolutions on Arm
Trusted Firmware Updates

- Arm Trusted Firmware
  → TrustedFirmware.org
  - Open Governance project
  - Reference implementation of secure world software for Armv7-A, Armv8-A and Armv8-M
  - Trusted Firmware-A for A-class (TF-A)
  - Trusted Firmware-M for M-class (TF-M)
  - Foundation of Arm’s Platform Security Architecture (PSA)
  - [https://www.trustedfirmware.org/](https://www.trustedfirmware.org/)
Secure Software Isolation Recap

• As the firmware on the Application Processor (AP) is getting bigger and more complex to audit, there is a strong need for:
  – Separation of liability amongst services through isolation
  – Restriction of the level of privilege available to each service

• Software architecture support needed to provide isolation between components in the Arm Secure world
  – Applicable to existing Armv8.3 and earlier Armv8 architecture
  – Ready to support Armv8.4 Secure-EL2 virtualization extension

• Standard interfaces at component boundaries to enable
  – Distinct software to interoperate and be audited separately
  – Removal of vendor specific code from secure firmware
Secure Partitions Recap – Single SP

Secure Partitions (SP):

- Unprivileged software sandbox environment running in the Secure world
- Isolated execution context
- Limited access to system resources
- Execute UEFI image with Standalone Management Mode support to execute secure management services
- Leverage Arm MM Specification: MM_COMMUNICATE SMC to request partition services
- Code reuse between normal/secure world whenever possible
- Reduced services code into privileged Trusted Firmware (EL3)
- EDK2 StandaloneMmPkg
Secure Partitions Recap – Multiple SPs

Secure Partition Manager (SPM):
• Runs at EL3 as part of the Runtime portion of Trusted Firmware-A
• Enforces principle of least privilege
• Initializes SP at boot time and manages runtime requests
• Enables communication between service requestors and providers
• Implements Secure Partition Client Interfaces (SPCI), MM evolution

Use-cases:
• Secure Variable access / FW Update
• fTPM implementation
• Errata handling / RAS Errors handling
• BMC communication
End game on Armv8 UEFI systems?
Here comes the Edge

...still few problems to solve...

- Firmware specific challenges in the Edge space
  1. UEFI Standalone MM Services plus concurrent Trusted OS/Apps
  2. UEFI & ACPI on legacy U-Boot/DT Edge devices
- Multiple Firmware Signing Domains for Secure Services
  - Common problem to Edge/Infrastructure/Cloud

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Deployment requirements with mixed scenarios of:

- Trusted OS – handling dedicated Trusted Applications for specific security tasks
- Secure Partition(s) running UEFI Standalone MM services for handling separate platform functions

**Secure Partition Client Interface** accommodates TOS specific needs, enabling

- Standardised communication between any Secure Partition and Normal/Secure world
- Migration path towards Armv8.4 S-EL2 virtualization extension
Armv8.4 architecture introduces a Secure-EL2 virtualization extension.

Coupled with secure SMMUv3.2 & GICv3.1 virtualization extension, this will allow HW enforced isolation and virtualization based security in the Secure world.

The related Software architecture will enable scenarios with:
- TEE/TOS coexistence with Standalone MM secure services running into fully isolated Secure Partitions at either S-EL0/S-EL1.

Visit www.uefi.org for more information.
Multiple Firmware Signing Domains

Problem: different signing owners for different Secure FW entities:

- **SiP**
  - Trusted Firmware-A
  - Platform Services
- **ODM/OEM/IBV**
  - UEFI Firmware
  - UEFI Standalone MM Services
  - (Trusted OSs + TAs)

Each signing entity might be independent from any other: no cascade-signing for independent deployment
Signing Domains and Chain of Trust

Existing single cascading CoT for Trusted Boot Flow

Investigating CoT split with different signing domains on Trusted Boot

EL0: OS App, OS App
EL1: OS Kernel
EL2: BL33 UEFI Firmware
EL3: BL31 Runtime Trusted Firmware

Root of Trust PK
BL1 ROM
BL2
BL32 Secure Partition

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BL32 SP1
BL32 SP2
BL1 ROM
BL2
BL33 UEFI Firmware

UEFI/NW Root of Trust PK

SIP signing
ODM/OEM/IBV signing
Trusted Components
How we pretend it to look like... vs. how it looks like in reality...

UEFI Firmware available
Generic HLOS based on ACPI/AML
Different Firmware and HLOS owners

How it looks like in reality...

U-Boot based boot flow, NO UEFI
Embedded OS, bundled with FW